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1. SOUTH AFRICA: THE LATENT INSTABILITY
South Africa, over past decades, has not been what one could 
describe as an unstable society. Investment risk analyses frequently 
place South Africa among the more risk-free countries of the world.
The level of labour unrest is below that in the more strike-prone 
European economies, like the UK and Sweden.^
The urban disturbances of June 1976 onward in Soweto and 
other black areas gained very widespread publicity and the loss of 
life represented an immense historical tragedy. However, the 
security apparatus of the state was barely extended even at the 
most critical times. The participants were mainly youthful and 
non-economically active. Various calls for stay-away strikes in 
support of the demonstrators either failed or had brief, mdeiocre 
success. Any escalation of the violence could have called for 
the massive counter-violence from the authorities against which 
the demonstrators would have been pathetically ill-equipped.
Youth demonstrations in European capitals like Berlin and Amsterdam 
have at times been more serious than the June 1976 uprisings in 
South Africa.
Yet every sign of instability in South Africa, whether 
it be a strike, a rent demonstration, a bus-boycott or a youth 
protest has a resonance which similar events in Europe lack. This, 
obviously, is because South Africa is assumed to contain within it 
certain potentials for an instability which could tear apart the 
fabric of the society and the economy.
It is necessary, perhaps, to inspect this assumption by 
enumerating the broad factors which militate for and against instability.
1) In South Africa in 1981, 35 man-days per 1 OOO workers were lost 
compared with 45 in the UK and 105 in Sweden (1980 figures).
Report of Rational Manpower Commission, 1981.
Factors (all well-known) which create the potential for instability are:
- clearly distinct social groups (races) with wide disparities
in income and life chances;
- exclusive control of the central legislative and instruments
of government and administration by the more privileged white 
group;
- formal and imposed social and political identities for the less-
privileged group which create a solidarity by making the move­
ment of individuals into the ruling groups impossible;
- government commitment to a programme which would exclude the
black majority from participation in the central government 
in perpetuity;
- partly as a consequence of the above, lack of opportunities
for leaders in the black majority to peacefully negotiate 
political reforms at the centre;
- once again, partly as a consequence of the above, a weakly-
developed internal black leadership committee to a moderate 
and peaceful negotiating strategy;
- a continuing pattern of administration of blacks which produces
frustration and constant reminders of a lesser political status 
(controls on movement, forced resettlement, restriction to 
certain residential areas, exclusion from most of the better 
educational institutions, etc.);
- an externally-based leadership claiming allegiance of the
black majority, committed to the violent overthrow of white 
rule by insurgency and revolution if necessary;
- a well-established programme of insurgency, supported by
sympathetic major powers in the form of training, weapons 
and funding;
- international movements, the UN Committee Against Apartheid,
the Anti Apartheid Movement, etc. of confrontation, mobilising 
various kinds of moral and symbolic support for punitive 
action against the South African government;
- ongoing development in the technology of violent insurgence
(more and more effective 1 ightweight explosives, portable 
rocket launches, etc.) which makes insurgency more and more 
viable as a weapon against the government; and finally
- ample evidence that black dissidents can leave the country
for training and re-enter South Africa either for insurgency 
or in order to mobilise the local black populations for 
action of various kinds.
These are the factors which create the assumption that 
South Africa has a potential for extreme disruption, if not a 
blood bath. This assumption, obviously, can be seen to be well- 
founded.
Operating against instability, however, are the following factors:
- a vigorous economy which in the past has proved its capacity
to increase employment opportunity, incomes and general well- 
fare among all groups;
- total white control over and majority white personnel in the
combined security forces of the country;
- relatively-speaking, a massive security establishment well-
organised to counter threats to social order;
- security curbs which over-ride legal controls, which severely
restrict or discourage individuals likely to organise people 
to action against the government, thus preventing a confront- 
ationist leadership developing within the country;
- a high rate of success (+ 90 percent according to police
spokesmen) in tracking down active insurgents;
- very marked superiority of whites over blacks as regards
educational levels, technological and managerial skills 
thus making it difficult for blacks to envisage displacing 
white administration and control;
- serious divisions among blacks over strategies for change,
compared with near-unity among the very substantial white 
minority that the basic patterns of the society should be 
protected;
- a massive consistency in the administration of separation
and inequality, projecting an image for blacks of the 
immutability or resilience of the system.
These opposing lists of factors contain nothing new, but they 
illustrate a situation which can be symbolically described as "irrestable 
force versus immovable object" South Africa's stability rests on a 
neutralisation of massive potential violence by an equally massive 
and pervasive system of controls and rewards, with the latter more 
efficient up to now.
The main point to consider, however, is that this balance 
or neutralisation of forces can change, and could even shift quite 
rapidly. For example, if insurgency increases beyond a point at 
which a majority of insurgents are apprehended, then obviously it 
will escalate rapidly after that. If the economy becomes chronically 
unable to increase or maintain income and employment levels, the number 
of recruits for insurgency-training abroad will escalate. The latter 
is a very real danger at the moment, but the downturn is temporary.
Furthermore, as the black population becomes more and 
more educated and more and more politicised (both inevitable) the 
pervasive sense of the unchangeability of the system will diminish.
A result in the form of more and more internal social and labour unrest, 
which at the very least will affect economic confidence, could unleash 
other consequences. The ice of peace and order in South Africa is thin.
2. CHANGE AND REFORM: ARE THEY ADEQUATE?
Reform in the circumstances of quality of life of the mass, 
of the people is a good in itself and in this sense need not be debated. 
However, in South africa, reform is also seen as necessary in order to 
strengthen the basis of stability. This view is predominant among 
these whites who want basic reform. After the urban disturbances 
in 1976, it became fashionable to call for the building of a contented 
black middle class as a bulwark against urban unrest. The Prime Minister1 
espousal of development and reform at the well-publicised "Carlton1’ 
and "Good Hope" conferences carried the same message.
The pace of reform has quickened in South Africa since 1976.
We can also accept that reform of a kind is inevitable in the future, 
partly as a consequence of justified moral pressures, partly in order 
to accommodate the needs of the expanding and changing economy and 
partly emanating from deliberate policy-designs of the government.
However, are the changes that are taking place adequate?
Is the reform programme of the government likely to deepen the conditions 
for peace and stability? Are some of the changes not perhaps likely 
to do more harm than good?
2.1 Patterns of change over recent past
The past few years since 1977 have seen the following shifts, 
trends adaptations and legislative changes in South African society:
2.1.1 Wages and employment: real wages in primary, secondary
and tertiary industry increased as follows between June 1980 and 
June 1982:1 '
whites 2,8 percent p.a
Coloureds 6,6 percent p.a
Indians 9,4 percent p.a
blacks 6,6 percent p.a
However, over the same period employment growth rates were:
whites 2,5 percent p.a. ^
Coloureds 1,9 percent p.a.
Indians 1,6 percent p.a.
blacks 1,5 percent p.a.
While the wage rates above indicate a narrowing of the wage 
and salary gap between blacks and whites, the growth rate in employment 
for blacks is well below the population growth rate of 3,2 percent p.a. 
Income rates for the black population will not have kept pace with the 
wage rates due to a rising ratio of earners to dependents.
2.1.2 Labour relations: The Labour Relations Amendment Acts of
1981 for the first time defined the black worker as an employee, thereby 
extending trade union rights to all races. Black trade unions which 
do not wish to register with the state authority may continue to operate, 
subject to certain controls which apply to registered unions.
1) Source: Government Statistical News Releases Calculations done
by V. Miller, J. Nattrass and L. Schlemmer.
Strikes and work-stoppages have shown the following pattern 
over the past eight years:
Black Employees - Rounded 
Man-days lost.T)__________
1973 + 260 000
1974 94 300
1975 18 300
1976 22 000
1977 15 000
1978 10 200
1979 16 500
1980 148 200
1981 206 200
In 1982 the trend seems to represent an increase over 1981, and the 
figure of man-days lost will probably be close to the high 1973 figure.
The loss of working time which the more recent figures suggest is 
fairly serious, since it places South Africa above many industrial 
economies in terms of strike-proneness. However, South Africa is 
still below the very strike-prone nations (as already indicated). 
Furthermore, political motivations have not yet emerged as a direct 
cause of labour unrest - the relatively slight bulge in the figures 
for 1976 tend to reinforce this impression, and that bulge could 
have been due to other factors. The recent sharp increases (1980/81/
82) are to some extent due to specific causes like the "pensions" strikes. 
Generally, after a new legal dispensation, a period of restiveness and 
re-adjustment accompanied by higher industrial unrest must be expected.
Given the fact, however, that few alternative outlets for 
political and community grievances exist for black people, the already 
fairly high levels of labour unrest could be aggravated by political 
motivations. The trends in labour unrest have to be watched with 
great concern.
2.1.3 Black Occupational Advancement: Job reservations of a
formal, statutory kind has been phased out with the exception of certain 
categories of work in the mining industry and Municipal service.
1) Source: 1973, calculation based on an answer to a question in
Parliament. 1974 onwards, Report of the National Manpower 
Commission, 1981.
At present negotiation is in progress aimed at the phasing out of 
these remaining restrictions on black advancement is in terms of 
changes in labour regulations of the black urban areas act, 
registered black workseekers are now no longer restricted to the 
area of their local authority but can seek an administration 
board, covering several local authority areas.
Overall patterns reveal steady black occupational advance­
ment. The following are results from the 1970 and 1980 population 
census:
Blacks as a Proportion of all 
Employees in the higher-level 
_________Occupations.___________
1970 1980
Professional, (higher-level)
technical and related workers 21% ■- 29%
Administrative, managerial and 
clerical workers 18% 27%
The rate of job advancemenet of blacks at very high level, 
however, has been dissappointingly slow, due partly to deficiencies 
in black education which inhibit successful job-role adjustment.
2.1.4 Social Integration: International hotels may apply for
an annual permit to integrate facilities and all social pursuits 
(including swimming and dancing). At other hotels, blacks may 
be admitted at the proprietor's discretion, without having to obtain 
permission in advance, subject to a report on numbers afterwards.
The Durban Corporation has approved a mixed beach and the 
Cape Provincial Administration has approved several mixed beaches. 
Restaurants now have right to apply for blanket permission to admit 
all races and any restaurant can admit on discretion subject to a 
report afterwards. Licenced social clubs can apply for blanket 
permission to admit all races. These permit are freely granted.
Non licenced clubs have no restrictions.
2.1.5 Education: There is increasing flexibility in the granting
of permission for non-white students to attend white universities. An 
open system is envisaged in the near future subject to a fixed maximum 
proportion of non-whites at white universities. Complete parity 
of remuneration for qualified teachers of all groups has been 
achieved. Since 1981 permission has been fairly readily 
granted by Natal and Cape Provincial Councils to private schools 
to admit black, Indian and Coloured pupils. The ratio of per capita 
expenditure on education for whites versus blacks has not changed, 
remaining at roughtly 10 to 1 over the past three years, but it is 
expected to improve in 1982/83 after the submission of the de Lange 
report ^  to the government earlier this year. The black education 
budget rose from R249 million in 1980/81 to R370 million for 1981/82. 
Compulsory education for blacks was introduced in 38 townships in 
1981, and this year is being steadily expanded to all areas in the 
Republic of South Africa, outside the homelands.
During 1981, the number of Adult Education Centres, allowing 
blacks to undergo schooling on a part-time basis increased from 157 
to 369. The number of blacks passing the Std. 10 school-leaving 
examinations has increased from 2 360 in 1970 to an estimated 
23 086 in 1980 - a ten-fold increase.
2*^*6 Training: The new consolidated Manpower Training Act
of 1981 rationalises and streamlines the process of industrial 
training for all groups. A large range of training facilities for 
blacks exists and total trained output is rising fairly rapidly. In 
1978, Africans were allowed to enrol as apprentices in the common 
area for the first time. Now, although a small minority of total 
apprenticeships, African apprenticeship training is increasing 
rapidly. In 1979 there were no black apprentices, in 1980 there 
were 82 and in 1981 there were 495.
The number of black children in schools and colleges for 
technical education rose from 3 145 in 1980 to 5 195 in 1981. Although
1) Human Sciences Research Council investigation into Education, 
undertaken at the request of the Prime Minister, under the 
Chairmanship of Professor J.P. de Lange.
the absolute number is still low, this is a respectable increase.
In-service technical training of blacks is increasing more 
rapidly. The number of blacks being trained in private in-service 
schemes and centres and in the public in-service training in 1981, 
and both figures are a very large increase on earlier years.^
2.1.7 Housing: Most of the indices of change discussed above
show fairly positive patterns. The same cannot be said of housing.
Among blacks there is currently a housing backlog in urban and peri-
2 )
urban areas, including homelands of some 600 000 units. At 
roughtly R10 000 per unit including services, this means that 
R6 000 000 000 at current prices will be required to eliminate the 
black housing backlog. This does not take account of the annual 
increase in demand of something like 100 000 units.
Against these estimates of the need, the amount of housing 
for blacks being constructed is very low indeed. From April of 1976
to the end of 1981, under 70 000 units for blacks were developed outside 
the homelands. In the 1981 calender year, roughly R320 million was 
spent on black housing in both the common and homeland areas. This 
contrasts with the roughly R1 000 million needed each year in all 
areas (at R10 000 per unit) to meet the animal increase in demand.
In other words, one-third of the annual amount required is being 
spent quite apart from the elimination of the backlog.
Needless to say, it is very unlikely that the required 
amounts will be spent. The government has taken various steps to 
encourage and facilitate private sector involvement in black housing. 
Housing utility companies will also be established in larger urban 
areas. Nevertheless, the standards of housing for blacks at the 
lower-income levels are likelyto drop since most of the new housing
1) Figures from the report of the National Manpower Commission.
2) Estimate compiled from various sources in the Centre for Applied 
Social Sciences. Mercabank (Focus on Key Eeonom'ic Issues,
No. 29, Oct. 1981) put the figure at 560 OOO.
10 .
level have to be of a self-help kind using semi-traditional materials, 
a process which the government has started to encourage. Housing is
likely to be a chronic problem over the next decade.
2.1.8 Unemployment: Official figures obtained from the govern­
ment Current Population Surveys, relating to black unemployment showed 
a decrease from 9,3% in 1979 to 8,5 percent and 7,3 percent in 1980 
and 1981. With the economic downturn, black unemployment is once 
again increasing. These figures have to be increased by about 2 to
3 percent overall if male and female under-employment is to be 
included. Even so, the figures are likely to be under-estimated 
since many of the informal shack areas in which the unemployed and 
under-employed are concentrated, are difficult to survey. Hence black 
unemployment could be well in excess of 10 percent. Fully 60 percent 
of the unemployed in the population surveys are under 30 years of 
age. In some areas known to the author more than 60 percent of 
black-school leavers are unemployed for the first two years.
While unemployment has not increased, apart from the trends 
in sluggish phases of the economy, its levels among blacks, particularly 
young adults are enough to cause grave concern.
2.1.9 Rights of blacks in the developed industrial centres:
Recent legislative changes, including the Black Local Authorities Act 
(see later) and the introduction of the 99 year leasehold scheme in 
urban black townships in the common area have illustrated the fact 
that the government has accepted blacks as permanent residents in
the common area of the Republic of South Africa - a change from the 
1960's.
The Influx Control laws ("Pass Laws") continued to be 
enforced with vigour and showed only a mild decline in urban areas:
Arrests in terms of Influx Control 
Laws - Main urban area s.1)
1979
1980
1981 (estimated from 1st.
127 000 
118 000
to 6 months) 109 000
The latter figure reflects a sharp decline in action by
the South African police, but an increase in prosecutions by the 
Administration Boards in the main centres. Hence, the unemployment 
of policy by the government department responsible for black affairs 
shows no sign of softening.
This attitude has been reflected more recently in legislation 
drafted by this department (Cooperation and Development) . Contrary to 
certain recommendations in the Riekert Commission, new legislation 
drafted in 1981 and again in 1982 would actually have the effect of 
reducing the right of access to the developed urban economy. The 
draft legislation (the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Persons 
Draft Bill) has come under such heavy criticism that it has had to 
be withdrawn for reconsideration. This step required the inter­
vention of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs under a different 
minister. There appears to be a strong and persisting determination 
in the bureaucracy responsible for black urban affairs to maintain or 
increase the rigidity of the proscriptions on black urban rights.
Other examples are also available, notably a tightening up on the 
concessions to commuters from KwaZulu to enter Natal to seek or 
take work.^
1) Source. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1981,
South Africa Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1982, 
(on the basis of answers to questions in parliament).
2) Evidence to the Buthelezi Commission of Enquiry into the Future 
of Ratal and KwaZulUy Durban. H and H Publications, 1982.
2.1.10 Security action against dissidents: Apart from actual
trials which offer the protection of due process, during 1981 at any 
given time there were between 120 and 150 people in detention. 
Detentions in terms of the Internal Security Act appear to have 
been a rough average of 100 days.^ But the period seems to have 
been shorter in detentions in terms of other acts. A count by the 
S.A. Institute of Race Relations suggests that the overall numbers 
of people detained in 1980 and 1981 were 768 and 630.
In 1979, 77 people were convicted for political offences 
of a serious kind, in 1980 the figure was 52 and in 1981 it may 
have declined marginally, although full figures are not available.
On the other hand, acts of sabotage, presumably mainly committed 
by persons infiltrating the country appeared to increase (the 
figures above include less serious crimes than sabotage). Since 
1976 there had been 110 acts of sabotage, of which as many as 37 
were committed in 1981.^
As authoritarian states go, these figures are not 
unusually dramatic (in Poland at one stage earlier this year at 
least 15 000 people were in detention, for example). However, 
they provide ample evidence of the continuig existence of a political 
underground movement of substantial proportions.
The detentions without trial and bannings (not referred 
to above) also illustrate the extent to which the state considers 
itself forced to circumvent the courts in the protection of the system. 
There features, as well as certain controls over the media and access 
to information reflect the government has to attempt to secure 
legitimacy by authoritarian means. It all adds up to a weak moral 
position of the existing order in South Africa.
1) Survey of Raoe Relations in South Africa, 1980 and 1981.
This legitimacy problem, however, is well recognised by 
the Prime Minister and certain other ministers, since over the past 
three years they have taken pains to state publicly that reform will 
be more effective than coercion in securing the safety of the society 
in the longer term.
2.1.11 Constitutional reform: In 1982, the Black Local
Government Act was passed, providing for fully fledged black 
municipal rights and functions on a basis equivalent to whites.
It remains to be seen, however, with what speed the act will be 
implemented, since the introduction of the new system will depend 
on the judgement of the Minister in the case of each local black 
township.
Subsequent to the report of the President's*Counci 1 on 
Constitutional reform, the government proposes to introduce 
legislation to give Coloureds and Asians representation in separate 
chambers in parliament. All matters common to all three groups 
will have to be dealt with by each chamber. Joint standing 
committees will provide for some joint decision making. A mixed 
Coloured, Indian and white President's Council will act as an Upper 
House for arbitration and review. The ratio of representatives will 
be 5:3:1 for whites, Coloureds and Asians respectively. This ratio 
is likely to be roughly mirrowed in the President's Council. There 
will be an Executive State President assuming the powers of the 
present Prime Minister, with an appointed Cabinet. The autonomous 
powers of the Presidency will increase vis-s-vis parliament, but 
these powers will probably fall short of those, say, of the French 
President. The President will be elected by a parliamentary 
Electorial College, which will ensure a white choice. It is fully 
expected that there will be two or three Coloured and Asian members 
of the Cabinet.
At local and provincial levels of government, the proposals 
are not clear. From the ongoing debate, it would seem as if the
the following will emerge: the Provincial level of government will
be attenuated, delegating some powers downward and some to the 
centre. Directly elected provincial representation will fall away 
with either nominees of the new Minister of Constitutional Affairs 
and for Local Government or of local and regional authorities taking 
office as executive councillors under a nominated Administrator.
The function of the Provincial level will be largely that of co­
ordinating local and regional affairs.
At the next tier, there will be Regional or Metropolitan 
authorities, dealing with matters relating to bulk services, physical 
planning, infrastructure, etc. Representatives will be nominated 
by Local Authorities in proportion to the tax-base or services- 
consumption of the various nominating groups, ensuring a white 
majority. It has been hinted by the Prime Minister that representatives 
of black local authorities could serve on these largely a - political 
bodies. This level of government will effect some redistribution of 
the proceeds of taxes to the poorer communities, in the form of services 
they would not otherwise afford.
At the lowest tier of government, there will be separate 
local authorities for the different groups although it is probable 
that very small Coloured and Asian residential areas in white cities 
will be integrated into the white system. The Prime Minister has 
hinted at the possibility of integrated voters' rolls as one of the 
options. The Minister of Constitutional Affairs has given the 
reassurance that financial provisions will be made to make smaller 
Coloured and Indian "dormitary" municipalities financially viable.
A great many of the most sensitive issues of inter-racial contact 
will be within the functions of the local authorities, such as 
mixed amenities. However, there will be a government department for 
the Co-ordination of Local Government, under a Minister of Local 
Government. What powers to over-ride local authority decisions 
will exist will yet become evident.
On the one hand, the proposals represent a break with the 
trend over the past thirty years to reduce the direct influence in 
government of Coloured and Indian people. As such the government 
has taken a step in the direction of constitutional reform which 
is not to be dismissed lightly. In fact, the split in the governing 
part (see later) was in large measure a reaction to these proposals.
Furthermore, the principle of having to obtain successive 
approval of three chambers with links in the form of joint standing 
committees will force "consensus" government or issues of common 
concern. Although the legislative process will be cumbersome, 
in a divided society, consensus mechanisms ("consociation") are a 
vital necessity. In this sense the proposals have merit.
On the other hand, the proposals contain a number of 
weaknesses which will reduce the functional effectiveness as means 
of securing stability:
- blacks have been completely excluded, with quite explicit 
statements that the political connection blacks will have 
with central government will be through the confederation 
of Southern African regions, involving no more than a 
consultative relationship. The one-sided constitutional 
reform can be expected to aggravate the political alientation 
of blacks. Furthermore, with common-area black local 
government falling under a ministry of the central government 
while other political rights have to be exercised through 
homeland governments and back to the central government
via a confederation, quite serious contradictions in 
structures are created.
- The proposals to dismantle the provincial level have the 
appearance of a strategy to prevent Coloureds and Asians 
coming close to controlling any regional authority (Indian 
in Natal and Coloureds in the Cape have the numbers to
make this possible). The insistence that local authorities 
be separated according to race is another example. The image 
of such constitutional planning is that of engineering 
developments in such a way as to retain white control in all 
spheres in which whites are affected.
- The same principle applies at Pariiamentary level, where the 
separate ethnic chambers for Coloureds and Indians have a 
permanent political minorities. In a more open system, minority 
groups can identify with political interest groups which cut 
across ethnic divisions, thus affording them fully-fledged
participation. The strict principle of ethnic autonomy 
strengthens racial and ethnic solidarity which, if blocked 
by a number's imbalance, can encourage extra-parliamentary 
political action (as in Northern Ireland).
The government's rationalisation for this, embodied 
in the concept of "segmental autonomy" (or the "food forces 
make good neighbours" principle) cannot be expected to acquire 
credibility among groups with a formal minority status 
guaranteed in perpetuity.
- The proposals at the central level imply a clear distinction 
between matters of ethnic community concern and matters of 
common concern, with the President's Council or arbiter. Any 
realistic appraisal will suggest that there are few matters which 
are of group concern only. This issue is likely to be a cause 
of great conflict in the machinery of government. A good 
example is the Group Areas Act, a topic which is likely to be 
raised very early by the Coloured House. Whites will claim
it is a matter of community concern, but Coloureds and Indians 
will insist that white residential privileges diminish their 
access to land and housing, and hence should be a matter for 
joint consideration.
- Already, strong pressures are being exerted on the government by 
conservative Municipal Associations (Sunday Express,1/11/82)
to reduce the status of Regional and Metropolitan government 
to that of consultative bodies and to maintain street segregation 
in local government. If these are to be the outcomes, then 
conflict will be reinforced by an abrupt frustration of the new 
Raised expectations of Coloured and Indian voters.
One saving feature of the new dispensation is that after the 
failure some years ago of the Coloured Persons' RepresentativeCouncil, 
the government needs the successive participation of Coloureds and 
Indians as much as the latter need political progress. Possibly 
compromises can be expected.
2.1.12 The New Regional Development Policy: In order to attempt
to counter the increaseing centralisation of economic growth, the 
pressure for black urbanisation and to attempt to stimulate development 
closer to the black rural areas, the government has announced the 
formation of a new decentralisation strategy involving increased 
incentives for development in eight demarcated regions straddling 
the borders of white areas and national states. In addition to 
decentralisation of employment "cooperative projects" across "soft"
borders between homelands and the common area are envisaged. A 
Southern African Development Bank will provide development aid 
on various forms.
These proposals have a great deal of merit but suffer from 
the following possible shortcomings and dangers:
- If the Regional Development Policy is to be mainly concerned
with decentralisation of economic activity which could or 
would or does occur elsewhere, then it will fail. Decentral­
ised job-creation in the formal sector is expensive (some 
existing growth points entail a cost of up to R35 000 for 
the creation of each job if one takes account of infrastructure 
costs). Overall job-creation may be retarded.
- The institutional framework for the administration and planning
of the regional development nodes is very complex. In the 
"white" areas the advisory committees are heavily dominated 
by institutional representatives and civil servants. An 
innovative planning input is likely to be lacking.
- In the early stages of the formulation of the strategy in 1980
and 1981 it was hoped that opportunities would exist for joint 
decision making between black and white in regions straddling 
the political boundaries. As the strategy has emerged in 
practice, only joint consultation on an advisory basis seems 
likely to result. Hence the Regional Development Strategy 
will use political legitimacy among blacks.
- Great difficulties have existed in launching the Development
Bank because of its inevitable connection with this proposed 
confederation. Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu, for example, has 
stated that it is impossible for him to accept a bank with a 
board composed of members composed to represent the varying 
statuses of participants in the political structures of 
Separate Development. While a purely commercial or professional 
development bank is a dire necessity, a politicised institution 
serving not only the purpose of development but also the function 
of promoting the confederation is a doubtful economic innovation.
2.2 Assessment of Implications.
These are the major pol itical, social and economic developments 
in South African society over the past few years. ■ They represent a very 
mixed balance-sheet in terms of change and stability.
Generally speaking, trends and development in the following 
areas are fairly positive:
- wage-rates for blacks;
- access of blacks to certain urban recreational amenities;
- ski 11s-training;
This is not to say that the performance of reform cannot 
be improved. Deeper-lying problems often affect the speed of change 
in the areas mentioned above. For example, the quality of basic 
education affects the trainability of blacks. The location of 
black residential areas far out of town reduces access to urban 
amenities. Wage rates cannot escalate too rapidly during periods 
of economic recession in order to avoid mechanisation and labour- 
intensive developments in industrial production, which could reduce 
the capacity of the economy to absorb labour.
Areas where development and/or reform is taking place,
but too slowly, given the implications, are the following:
- unskilled and semi-skilled employment creation/
combating unemployment;
- occupational advancement of blacks;
- improvements in the funding and quality of
black education;
In all these areas there are fundamental problems which no 
government could solve overnight. Nevertheless, sustained programmes, 
involving the coopertion of many agencies and individuals both within 
and outside of the private sector are required in order to begin to 
marshall the resources necessary to solve the underlying problems.
The following areas in which ongoing processes of development 
are totally inadequate at the present stage.
- Housing development (to which one must add a range of other
basic needs in the form of both rural and urban amenities
for blacks);
The rights of blacks in the common area-developments 
to counter the political alienation of this vital 
category of political actors;
- Constitutional development - the need to engender a
wider "legitimacy" to the proposals;
- Regional development - the need to make it more than
a decentralisation programme but also a programme for 
development within and with black communities in the 
regional development areas;
- labour relations in regard to the black labour force.
Particular needs in this regard are to reduce the
danger of labour action becoming counter-productive 
for employment creation and labour-intensive 
strategies, and investor confidence. Another need 
is to prevent the escalation of conflict through the 
intervention of government agencies or attempts to 
impose coercive control.
Both these goals require:
a greater degree of trust in the economic system and 
its institutions (pension funds being the most recent 
example);
redress for black workers as regards circumstances in 
their communities and in the sphere of benefits outside 
of the workplace; and
a credible arbitration function in cases of deadlock.
All these requirements can only be met constructively 
by the emergence of credible political leadership at 
the local level in the industrial areas which can inter­
pret, informally provide arbitration in crisis situations, 
and work successfully for the improvement in the quality 
of life of black workers.
If one considers the various implications, the broad 
requirements in all of the key areas for change identified require 
strong and effective yet responsible local level political leadersh 
which is sufficiently successful to be credible among blacks. For 
example, housing programmes will not be successful unless blacks 
accept more modest standards and put in a considerable measure of 
self-help. This requires political leadership. A gradualist 
policy in reform at the level of urban rights will have to satisfy 
everyone at once since presumably some influx controls will have 
to remain for a period. Here again the discipline imparted by 
credible local level political leadership will be essential.
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Effective black participation in "cooperation projects" 
within the Regional Development policy also requires the mobilisation 
of local level black leadership in homeland areas. For this purpose
more than mere consultation is required. Serious joint planning 
ventures have to be undertaken.
Add to this the compromises necessary in the labour relations 
field and one has a daunting task for an emergent black local level 
leadership. The ability to engage in realpolitik and to take and 
sell unpopular decisions will be paramount. This will strain the 
credibility of the local level leadership immensely.
Credibility of moderate leadership will simply never be 
forthcoming while the constitutional agenda of the central government 
is closed to blacks. At this stage, any black political actor who 
inter-acts responsibly with the real world of reform runs the 
risk of being labelled a collaborator "on a train to the (Apartheid) 
Confederation".
3 * MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS IN THE RESPONSE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
It would seem that in order to judge what kind of response 
to these challenges one may expect from the central government, one 
has to consider the government's own situation and the assumptions 
it makes. The following appear to be keynote features:
- the government possibly fears that it cannot move more 
rapidly or incisively on reform for fear of augmenting 
the right-wing threat. Numerous attitude surveys 
undertaken by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences 
in cooperation with Mark-en-meningsopnames tend to 
show that as far as white voters are concerned (not 
necessarily party office-bearers) the right wing has 
already garnered most of its potential support.
However strong it is, it cannot grow much stronger, 
and in the latter regard, economic policies are just 
as relevant as political/constitutional affairs.
Furthermore, the attitude surveys show that the inclusion 
of blacks into a process of gradual reform, does not reduce
the level of acceptance of constitutional alternatives 
at all.
Put differently, the damage is done and the limiting 
of constitutional reform to Coloureds and Asians only 
is seen by existing government supporters as much as 
a weakness as a safeguard (and it loses the government 
some potential support from the opposition voters to the 
political "left").
It is simply too late now for the government to claim 
that conservative voter reaction prevents a broadening 
of the base of constitutional reform. Its problems, 
on the contrary, lie within the party and the support 
organisations.
- Much of the theoretical underpinnings of the constitutional
recommendations of the President’s Council report revolved 
around the impossibility of the incorporation of black 
political demands into the present system of the South 
African polity. The constitutional proposals are based 
on an implicit assumption that numbers must determine 
power (recall the 5 - 3 - 1  ratio). However* the black 
political demands will not go away and in the end could 
cost South Africa much more in terms of stability than 
the dangers of opening up the constitutional agenda to 
blacks.
Once again referring to available and representative 
studies of attitude, in particular those conducted for the 
Buthelezi Commission, it is clear that majorities of 
blacks will accept the legitimacy of a "consociational" 
arrangement in the form of even a few credible black 
representatives sitting on key political decision-making 
bodies. Such arrangements when proposed to blacks even 
among very angry and politicised groups, gain almost 
as much support as the one-man-one-vote option.
- Furthermore, by now the government must certainly be
realising that the acceptance of the constitutional 
proposals are as problematic among Coloured and Indian 
people and among key-influentials in the white academic, 
professional and business communities as they are among 
grass-roots white voters. An opening of the constitutional 
developments to blacks could ease problems in this area 
enormously.
A rejoinder to these considerations is that the inclusion 
of blacks at this stage will represent a major deviation from government 
policy, and as such is an unrealistic political demand. This is not so. 
There are ways in which existing policy can be adapted in order to start 
providing for the extension of legitimacy to a moderate and constructive
type of black leadership at the levels required by the needs outlined
earl ier.
4- IMMEDIATE ALTERNATIVES TO GOVERNMENT POLICY
4.1 The policy of Separate Development has acquired all its negative 
connotations from the overall goals of a complete separation of 
white and black decision-making. Despite this, the policy has 
been moderately successful in mobilising the participation of blacks 
in the homelands. Many very sincere blacks have grabbed the 
limited opportunities made available in the homelands for 
participation in a political process. Rid of the goal of 
complete political separation or severance, the institutions
of government in the homelands would become considerably 
enhanced.
4.2 Without the goal of independence, the policy of homeland 
government could be a healthy exercise in political 
decentralisation. It would in no way reduce, but rather would 
enhance the quality of grass-roots participation in politics.
The policy could acquire a new and far more acceptable meaning, 
both nationally and internationally. The critical issues are 
these of citizenship and separation of blacks from any input 
into fiscal decision-making.
4.3 Given the very established nature of homeland administration 
and government, the structures and institutions that have been 
created have a viability which could be useful in South Africa's 
political and economic development.
4.4 One basic and minimum requirement (and a possibility) is for 
the government to open the constitutional planning agenda to 
blacks by modifying the end goals of its policy of "multi­
national development". Whatever face-saving name the government 
chooses to give it, it could, for these areas which have not
yet taken independence, become a form of regional decentralised 
self-government - an exercise in political devolution.
The effect of this would be to enhance the status of the 
excellent quality of some homeland leadership, since they 
would no longer be associated with the dangers of loss of 
citizenship.
Without wishing to go into constitutional details at this point, 
an adaptation of the Executive structure of government at the 
centre would allow for the incorporation of homeland leadership 
into central decision-making processes. A Cabinet-level Council, 
operating along consociational lines is one possibility. This 
would allow, without danger of political domination or "swamping" 
by blacks, a black input into at least those matters which affect 
their development (national planning, fiscal policies, policies 
for housing provision,welfare and services, etc.)
The black participation could be by both homeland and common area 
leaders (black urban leaders).
Similtaneously, however, the urgancy of development problems and 
the need for effective cooperation in joint projects within the 
framework of the government's own policy of Regional Development 
requires political innovation at this level.
It is realised that the possibilities of cooperative decision­
making in a real sense have been canvassed within the regional 
development policy and that these possibilities were resisted 
by some government service agencies. At the very least, however, 
the government should be prevailed upon to re-explore the policy 
of joint black-white regional authorities with certain powers 
relevant to development being established in demarcated areas 
across the borders of the Republic of South Africa and the home­
lands which are not independent.
4.7 I have made no suggestions in detail about the issue of Influx 
Control. This issue is so complex that to attempt to introduce 
real reform within a framework of gradualism without black 
participation in the process would be hazardous. The constitutional 
developments must be underway before any major initiatives. In 
a sense the government is right in delaying the re-introduction 
of the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Persons Draft Bill.
There are many matters of detail that could and should be 
explored. The problem of political legitimacy underlies them all, 
however, as the analyses I have attempted shows. Therefore, it is 
the constitutional reform which is a priority issue at the present time. 
The suggestions outlined could be accommodated within the outlines of 
existing policy, given determined political leadership. The business 
community and other key influentials should try to convey this to the 
government, as a matter of utmost priority.
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